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Abstract
Background: Health service reconfigurations are of international interest but remain poorly understood. This article
focuses on the use of evidence by senior managerial decision-makers involved in the reconfiguration of stroke
services in London 2008–2012. Recent work comparing stroke service reconfiguration in London and Manchester
emphasises the ability of senior managerial decision-makers in London to ‘hold the line’ in the crucial early phases of
the stroke reconfiguration programme. In this article, we explore in detail how these decision-makers ‘held the line’
and ask what the broader power implications of doing so are for the interaction between evidence, health policy and
system redesign.
Methods: The research combined semi-structured interviews (n = 20) and documentary analysis of historically relevant
policy papers and contemporary stroke reconfiguration documentation published by NHS London and other
interested parties (n = 125). We applied a critical interpretive and reflexive approach to the analysis of the data.
Results: We identified two forms of power which senior managerial decision-makers drew upon in order to ‘hold the
line’. Firstly, discursive power, which through an emphasis on evidence, better patient outcomes, professional support
and clinical credibility alongside a tightly managed consultation process, helped to set an agenda that was
broadly receptive to the overall decision to change stroke services in the capital in a radical way. Secondly, once the
essential parameters of the decision to change services had been agreed, senior managerial decision-makers ‘held the
line’ through hierarchical New Public Management style power to minimise the traditional pressures to de-radicalise
the reconfiguration through ‘top down’ decision-making.
Conclusions: We problematise the concept of ‘holding the line’ and explore the power implications of such
managerial approaches in the early phases of health service reconfiguration. We highlight the importance of
evidence for senior managerial decision-makers in agenda setting and the limitations of clinical research findings in
guiding politically sensitive policy decisions which impact upon regional healthcare systems.
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Background
Reconfiguration is “a deliberately induced change of
some significance in the distribution of medical, surgical,
diagnostic and ancillary specialities that are available in
each hospital or other secondary or tertiary acute care
unit in locality, region or healthcare administrative area”
[1]. A growing international literature focuses on system
wide health service reconfiguration, mergers and regional
hospital service re-design in Europe [2–8] and North
America [9–13]. These studies emphasise that reconfi-
gurations are notoriously problematic and proposed solu-
tions are frequently contested and bedevilled by conflict
amongst different policy actors [1, 4, 12]. Furthermore,
the subsequent results of new healthcare configurations
are often perceived as underwhelming [7, 14]. In this
article, we argue that a weakness in much of the existing
reconfiguration literature is that the interplay between
evidence, power and policy remains relatively uncharted.
We propose to remedy this through an exploration of the
reconfiguration of stroke services in London (2008–2012).
This particular reconfiguration appears to have bucked
the trend of most reconfigurations [7, 8, 15], because,
despite the fact that some hospitals lost their stroke
services altogether or saw them downgraded, it was imple-
mented in full, on time, and overcoming both potential
and real opposition from institutional actors and the wider
public; this is unusual [7, 12, 14], marking the case as a
‘positive outlier’ [16]. The reformed London stroke service
enjoyed broad political and popular support and has been
advanced as a model of reference for other areas of
England [17, 18]. Significantly, the new model is saving
lives and is cost effective compared to other models of
stroke care [19].
Recent work by Fulop et al. [15] comparing stroke
service reconfiguration in London and Manchester pro-
vides a valuable contribution to understanding system-
wide reconfiguration. The authors identify five key stages
in their analysis of the study of stroke service reconfi-
gurations in London and Manchester and emphasise
that, in the case of the London reconfiguration, stages 1
and 2 (Fig. 1) were “led by the regional authority ‘holding
the line’” [15]. In this article, our focus is exclusively on
these first two crucial stages. We explore how evidence
was utilised and power mobilised by senior managers in
order to ‘hold the line’ in the early stages of the reconfig-
uration. For us, ‘holding the line’ is a power-laden term,
but interestingly, Fulop et al. [15] do not explicitly
explore the role of power in their work. In linked
research, Turner et al. [8] explore the role of ‘system
leadership’ in designing the new model of stroke care
provision in London, again in comparison to Manchester,
and once more power is implicit but not explicit in their
analysis.
We problematise this concept of ‘holding the line’ and
ask what the broader power implications of ‘holding the
line’ might be for evidence use, healthcare system
redesign and the implementation of policy change. We
draw on separate qualitative research conducted by a
different research team with similar key informants to
the Fulop et al. [15] and Turner et al. [8] work in
London conducted at around the same time with a more
explicit focus on power and the discourse of evidence
based change. This research was funded separately from
the work pursued by Fulop, Turner and their broader
teams. However, both research teams were aware of each
other’s work and discussed some early findings infor-
mally. We interpret power in post-structuralist terms
[20–22], encouraging an analytical focus on language
and discursive strategies to validate policy decisions.
Discursive practice – who says what to whom (in speech
or writing) in certain contexts, and the legitimacy
derived from this use of language – may be seen to reflect,
maintain or challenge power relations amongst different
actors [22]. Nevertheless, discursive power sits alongside
other forms of power (for example, hierarchical, manager-
ial, jurisdictional and economic) in contemporary govern-
ance [21, 23, 24] and we also demonstrate how
hierarchical power was utilised through managerial struc-
tures by the senior strategic level executive team leading
the stroke care reforms in London.
We suggest that the discursive mobilisation of clinical
research evidence to frame hospital reconfigurations in
recent years is an increasingly important technique
aimed at depoliticising contentious choices [4, 25], align-
ing with macro-level assertions around the importance
of evidence-based medicine (EBM) to influence health
policy decisions more generally [26–29] and that this
was central to the London stroke service reconfigur-
ation. Change framed as ‘evidence based’ has a rhetorical
power that discourages dissent [25, 27] and a legitimat-
ing power that enables its proponents to establish
jurisdiction over specific fields of practice [26, 30, 31].
This study draws on this existing literature and applies it
to study how senior decision-makers mobilised the
Fig. 1 The case of the London reconfiguration, stages 1 and 2. Adapted from Fulop et al. [15]
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discourse of EBM as a technique of power [32, 33] so as
to ‘hold the line’ [15] and provide ‘system leadership’ [8]
in the critical early stages of the London stroke reconfig-
uration. We also show how senior strategic level managers
harnessed hierarchical techniques of power to ensure their
view of the newly configured services – how many special-
ist units, and where they would be located – was realised.
We suggest health policy and systems research should
unequivocally explore the concept of power and how it
interacts with research evidence and managerial influence
if we are to critically understand how complex reconfigur-
ation policies are translated into practice [34–36].
Methods
The research combined semi-structured interviews (n = 20)
and documentary analysis of historically relevant policy
papers and contemporary stroke reconfiguration docu-
mentation published by NHS London and in the public
domain (n = 125). NHS London was the managerial
body responsible for healthcare planning and delivery
across the London region from 2006 to 2012. It was
one of ten national Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs)
in England. NHS London provided strategic supervision
for the 31 Primary Care Trusts that commissioned local
health services in London and also had oversight for
some hospital services as well as ambulance and mental
health services. We pursued a single case study
approach that focused in detail and in depth on the
processes and principles behind service delivery changes,
namely what Stake [37] terms “particularisation”. Single
case studies can demonstrate “features or categories
relevant to a wide number of settings” [38]. This encour-
ages ‘analytic’ rather than ‘enumerative induction’, focusing
on transferability or generalisation in terms of theory
rather than population [39].
We analysed two distinct types of documents. Firstly,
the government commissioned strategic review of London
Healthcare led by Darzi [40]. Official policy documents
are useful for analysis because they seek to influence
views, beliefs and actions [41]. We conducted a formal
content analysis [42] of the Darzi review. The primary aim
was to explore what motivates change, for example, eco-
nomic drivers and/or service ‘quality’. The second docu-
mentary analysis focused on documentation published by
NHS London as part of the public stroke consultation and
implementation process building on the Darzi Review
recommendations. These included stroke strategy docu-
ments and guidance to health service commissioners,
NHS Trusts and other stakeholders. The analysis of these
documents enabled us to explore how the discourse of
evidence-based change was developed over time by NHS
managers, management consultants and stroke profes-
sionals leading the London stroke reforms. Informed by
analysis of the NHS London documents, we identified and
approached key actors leading the reconfiguration for
interview. The interviews focused on the pan-London
governance changes of the reconfiguration of stroke
services across London. The interview topic guide
explored why and how stroke care was ‘problematised’ in
London, the evidence behind the reconfiguration, man-
agerial techniques to realise the goals of the reconfigur-
ation, and potential impacts upon staff. At the heart of the
governance arrangements for the stroke reconfiguration
project in London sat a ‘Stroke Project Board’ (see Turner
et al. [8], figure 1, p. 158 for a summary of the governance
arrangements). The Stroke Project Board consisted of
clinical and managerial actors, many of whom also sat on
parallel ‘Clinical Expert’ and ‘Finance and Commissioning’
panels [43], which fed into the coordinating Stroke Project
Board through the planning and development and
consultation stages of the project.
Our sampling strategy aimed for depth rather than
breadth of involvement, selecting informants who had
served on the Stroke Project Board, Clinical Expert
Panel or the Financing and Commissioning Panel. These
individuals were purposively selected [44] because they
were closely involved in key clinical and managerial
decisions around the design and implementation of the
reformed service and also involved in reviewing and
recommending evidence to guide the reconfiguration.
We interviewed eight predominantly ‘clinical’ informants
(six senior stroke clinicians, representing medical, nursing
and therapies viewpoints; one Public Health Professor;
and one London Ambulance Service Assistant Medical
Director), and 12 predominantly ‘managerial’ informants
(five senior SHA managers, including Stroke Network
Directors; two senior Stroke Project Managers; one
Clinical Service Manager; two management consultants;
and two stroke charity representatives). Sixteen of the
informants were substantively employed by the NHS (in
commissioning, management and/or patient facing roles)
and four were not NHS employees. The non-NHS
employees were particularly useful in independently
gauging the ‘institutional’ influence of certain NHS actors;
for example, as comparatively independent stakeholders,
they were crucial to our ultimate analysis, especially where
we found disagreement amongst some NHS informants.
The fieldworker had established links with senior stroke
and public health clinicians through work on a separate
research project. Through these links he gained access to
the wider circle of clinical and managerial informants. The
fieldworker’s background in NHS management was also
helpful in securing access to a number of informants.
The research was retrospective. The key strategic deci-
sions behind the reconfiguration occurred over 2008–2009,
whilst the interviews were conducted in 2011–2012. This
historical approach is common in the social science litera-
ture relating to healthcare reconfiguration [5, 45]. Whilst
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recall can be a problem, there are advantages to a retro-
spective approach. A retrospective view on how and why
processes developed as they did through the analysis of
public documents combined with semi-structured key
stakeholder interviews exploring drivers and objectives of
change, enables critical examination of ‘stated and unstated
drivers’ behind change [45]. NHS ethics applications were
approved for the research.
All interviews were transcribed and analysed through
Nvivo [46]. We applied a critical interpretive [47] and
reflexive approach [48] to the analysis of the data. We
explored how information is not only distributed, but
produced, and how expertise, claims of truth and power
dynamics can be interpreted and understood drawing on
deductive analytic techniques producing primary codes
linked to these themes [32, 33, 49]. The data analysis
also generated other inductive themes. These could be
functional (e.g. audit and standards, measurement,
professional relations) or theoretical (e.g. conflict, special-
isation). These inductive themes were drawn upon in the
development of our two over-arching themes. For
example, the theme of ‘specialisation’ helped our develop-
ment of ideas linked to the ‘reification’ of stroke as an
emergency condition requiring a new discursive approach
and dynamic imagery. Likewise, audit, standardisation and
improved measurement align closely with key facets of the
New Public Management (NPM) [21].
The process then centred on building these fragments
into larger theory – going between the data and the wider
literature iteratively and exploring deviant cases [50]. Over-
all, we found great unanimity amongst our informants
around the ultimate goals of the reconfiguration. Neverthe-
less, we identified some interprofessional and jurisdictional
disputes amongst the accounts of some informants,
particularly around the balance between rehabilitation and
acute care reflected in the overall shape of the reconfigur-
ation. We also identified tensions between institutional and
‘pan-London’ loyalties for clinical and managerial infor-
mants. These contributed to our analysis by encouraging
us to consider the different ways in which evidence is
mobilised by certain professional groups [51] and also how
different actors identify with particular institutions.
Results
Our results are structured to correspond with the first
two stages of Fulop et al.’s [15] model (decision to
change and decision on which model to implement; see
Fig. 1 above) through which ‘holding the line’ was identi-
fied as significant. We explicitly analyse the concepts of
evidence and power within these two stages.
Decision to change
Senior SHA managers (who both set the remit for, and
oversaw, the work of the central Stroke Project Board as
introduced in the previous section) with wide ranging
responsibility for pan-London healthcare skilfully
harnessed the discursive power of ‘evidence’ from the
very start of the stroke service reconfiguration process
through voluminous documentation [40, 52, 53]. The
Darzi Review of London health services, which intro-
duced the concept of pan-London stroke reconfigur-
ation, drew on the word ‘evidence’ 35 times in the
57,000-word text; an indicative extract from the intro-
duction is cited below:
“This report makes recommendations for change. It is
based on a thorough, practitioner-led process, and
rooted in evidence – gathered from a wide range of
people and organisations from the world of healthcare
and from the NHS’s partners in local government and
beyond, from thorough reviews of the literature and
data, and from the use of a range of analytical
modelling techniques. It also reflects a major exercise to
hear what Londoners say they want from their
healthcare system.” ([40], p. 4)
The collaborative, clinically led authorship of Darzi’s
Report was heavily emphasised so that the appearance
(at least) of how London’s stroke care inadequacies were
‘problematised’ [32, 33] became one of professional
expertise rather than political or managerial decision-
making. The perceptions of the problems that hindered
effective stroke care and the prospective solutions were
tightly controlled within a specialist, professional dis-
course [54]. There was no talk of financial rationalisa-
tion, or the need for mergers in stark contrast to earlier
reviews of healthcare in London such as the Tomlinson
Review of 1992 [55]. Rather, the Darzi Review empha-
sised the importance of clinical evidence and perform-
ance metrics (and implicitly, a form of rationality
compatible to both professional and managerial stake-
holders) in the pursuit of excellence for all – expressed
by recurring phrases such as “World Class Care” [40].
The Darzi Review functions as a ‘blueprint’ for change
with a useful degree of ‘strategic ambiguity’ [12] in that
it enables clinical, managerial and public stakeholders
from across London’s hospitals to agree on key princi-
ples of stroke care reform without pinpointing the
details of where the reforms would take place, and
thereby locate the institutional winners or losers.
The managerial team leading the stroke reconfigur-
ation project (led by management consultants appointed
by the SHA executive team) developed a communication
strategy that explicitly advocated the use of clinicians:
“[A]s ambassadors stressing the clinical basis for
change’ and to ‘communicate [the reconfiguration] is
clinically-led and will save lives” ([56], p. 14)
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In this way, it was not only the type of discourse:
“clinical… clinically led” that was prescribed – but also
the key spokespeople were selected to be those with
clinical credibility and public trust in order to ‘hold the
line’ as part of this communication strategy. Patient
safety, and ‘life saving’ were prioritised in the framing of
the reforms lending moral legitimacy to the programme
[4, 25], alongside an economic rationale that highlighted
the inefficiencies of prior practice [57, 58]. Having mobi-
lised the discourse of evidence-based change, and
ensured coherence of this message through clinically
respected voices, senior managers also ensured that the
parameters of any potential debates amongst public and
professional stakeholders that might challenge the ‘line’
of the reforms were shaped by the project management
team, as this informant acknowledges:
“[W]e had our first pan London conference and that
was attended by representatives across London… And
we mixed everyone up and we eventually
workshop[ped ideas]… But we kind of had the answers
in our back pocket… And we were able to … [guide]
that conference to an answer that we had already, I
suppose, decided on… [We] were getting 150 to 200
people almost agreeing on 99.9% of what the problem
was and how to solve it.” (Management Consultant)
This quote gives a sense of how an agreed ‘line’ around
the nature of the problem of stroke in the capital, and a
way to resolving it, was managed by the project team
during the first stages of the reconfiguration – indeed
other informants spoke of the skill of management con-
sultants in maintaining a coherent trajectory through
these formative periods where stakeholder opinions were
canvassed. Numerous informants highlighted the posi-
tive role played by ‘independent’ stroke charity stake-
holders in publically backing the overall principles of the
reconfiguration, i.e. fewer, more specialised stroke centres.
Although the inclusive nature of the reconfiguration
process was emphasised in official literature [40, 53], in
reality, the options open to participants were limited as
senior management figures effectively shaped how the need
for the reforms was framed [25] and who was selected to
make the case to the public, whilst carefully managing the
discursive forums in which debate took place.
Decision on which model to implement
In the previous section, we highlighted how the London
stroke service reconfiguration was broadly framed as
both evidence based and clinically led by senior SHA
managers with overall responsibility for the reforms. We
suggested that this was important in establishing both
public and professional support for the reforms overall.
In this section, we explore firstly the decision to select
the particular ‘hub and spoke’ model of care chosen by
senior SHA managers; secondly, we question how the
decisions were made relating to which hospitals would
be commissioned to provide specific services as part of
the new model. The reformed London model is based
around a ‘hub’ of eight Hyper Acute Stroke Units
(HASUs), which exclusively admit all new stroke cases
and provide specialist acute care for the first 72 hours
post stroke onset. These eight HASUs are supported by
24 Stroke Unit ‘spokes’ that admit patients directly from
HASU care once clinically indicated. It was a senior
SHA management decision to implement an eight-site
HASU model and to reject the 10- to 12-site HASU
model as advised by the Clinical Expert Panel as part of
the reconfiguration negotiations [8]:
“[M]y attitude to it at the time was if we don’t dig our
heels in and say it’s eight [HASUs], I’m not interested
at all unless it’s eight, it will end up being fifteen, it
won’t end up being nine… [I]f we’re not careful, from
that we’ll get a mushrooming of numbers, then we
won’t have the results that we’re looking for. So the
answer’s eight. So that was top down, one size fits all.
And the reason for that was to prevent the traditional
London solution of saying, ‘Well we’ll have both’.”
(SHA Senior Manager)
This decision represented a management judgement
based on a determination to avoid the ‘inflationary’ [12]
mistakes of other attempts at reconfiguration and to
learn from historical failures in this area [8]. It also may
reflect the fact that there was a paucity of evidence avail-
able at the time to demonstrate the appropriate size that
a HASU should be with respect to activity levels. Rather
than clinical research evidence guiding the choice of the
eight-HASU model, it was in reality, a managerial calcu-
lation. The approach of the SHA was not consensual or
deliberative around this question of site numbers, but
firm and dictatorial [21]. This highlights the comple-
mentary importance of other – non-discursive – forms
of power also at play in this reconfiguration [23]. The
SHA executive enjoyed immense financial, hierarchical
and goal-setting power in London at this time compared
to the historical status quo ante in which strategic
healthcare planning and direction in the capital tended
to be much more fragmented [59–61]. The SHA execu-
tive team were able to draw on NPM style techniques
(e.g. hands on, active, organisational control through
explicit standards and performance measures [62]) to set
targets for all the relevant NHS (both clinical and non-
clinical) staff in London [21, 63] to mobilise action in
line with their strategic goals linked to stroke improve-
ment and hold a managerial ‘line’ emphasising the
London-wide importance of stroke:
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“So your objectives for the year, every chief executive in
London and every director here, I want to see where
your contribution to taking these things forward
figures in the top three things on your priorities… How
are you, as a finance director, developing the stroke
tariff in London? It should be at the top of your list
just like you’re the chief nurse. What are you doing
about the recruitment of specialist stroke nurses in
London? … I insisted on those being at the top of
everybody’s objectives. And therefore, when their
appraisal was done, if they hadn’t done it, then they
wouldn’t get a good grading.” (SHA Senior Manager)
The hierarchical power of the SHA executive over key
managerial and professional actors as demonstrated
above highlights how senior managers could ‘hold the
line’ throughout key NHS organisations and ensure that
the goals of the executive were upheld with relation to
the stroke reforms.
The decision about where to locate the eight proposed
HASUs drew upon competing institutional consider-
ations and negotiated priorities. London hospitals were
invited to bid for accreditation to host one of the eight
HASUs [64]. The SHA had devised a selection process
that attempted to reconcile the potentially conflicting
goals of service quality and patient access. The data
showed that many found this a difficult undertaking:
“[I]f you put quality criteria [first], you get one group
of eight [hospital sites suitable for HASU care]. If you
put access criteria [first], you get a different group. So
making the best of those two was difficult and required
adjustments to both.” (SHA Senior Manager)
Our interview data highlight an example of how such
‘adjustments’ may have been made by senior SHA man-
agers. Some informants indicated that, between the colla-
tion of the scores for individual hospital bids to provide
HASU services being evaluated and the proposed recon-
figuration being put out to public consultation, two ex
post adjustments were made by the senior SHA executive
team to the decision-making criteria. First, that HASU
services ought to be co-located with specialised trauma
services and, second, that HASUs ought to be co-located
with specialist neuroscience services:
“[W]e were asked [by the SHA executive team] to look
at was there an evidence base which actually could be
used to justify… the decision that those places that
had major trauma also had to have a hyper acute
unit in? And actually I think the answer was frankly,
‘no’… [T]here are no interdependencies really between
hyper acute stroke care and major trauma care.”
(SHA Stroke Project Manager 1)
“[W]e put together an argument as to why you had to
have trauma and stroke together. It took a bit of time
because you kept on having to say ‘Well there is no
argument.’…we’d produce the piece of paper as to why it
had to be together… If someone had said they’d got to
be separate, we could have forced it through as well.”
(Emphasis added) (SHA Stroke Project Manager 2)
“[It was] like a rabbit out of a hat and it really
was that startling – and I recollected being at the
meeting in which decisions were taken. The message
was delivered from on high, by which I took to be
[senior SHA managers], that there has to be
co-location, which significantly advantaged one of
the hospitals and disadvantaged another.”
(Stroke Charity representative)
In this instance then, for these informants, ‘holding the
line’ equated to the development of ex post criteria by
the SHA executive team and an instruction to project
managers that they search for evidence to justify co-
location. Whilst the project managers were asked to
engage in the discursive practice of “put[ting] an argu-
ment together” and producing documentation to suggest
that there was an evidence base to justify these deci-
sions, the hierarchical power of senior figures within the
SHA is highlighted by the view expressed by the second
project manager above that whatever the executive team
had requested: “we could have forced it through as well”.
Some informants suggested in interviews that the
impacts of these decisions left them feeling rather alien-
ated as the result of these decisions presaged the down-
grading of one of the best performing stroke services in
London, thus opening the HASU location process up to
accusations of ‘goalpost shifting’ amongst some of the
members of the Stroke Project Board and the shaping of
evidence to fit policy rather than the other way around:
“[T]he big controversy at the time was around HASUs,
and actually it had gone from being a really
transparent, really robust process that everyone
believed in, to being a bit make-it-up-as-you-go-along
and find evidence where you need it because it justifies
your political end basically. So it suddenly went from
being very transparent to being very suspicious.”
(Senior Clinician)
As highlighted in the quote above, whilst the senior
SHA managers alienated some stakeholders over this
issue – crucially – this did not derail or delay the overall
programme of reform. Ultimately, the ‘line was held’
during this second stage of the reconfiguration [15].
There are a number of reasons why this was the case.
Firstly, not all stakeholders were necessarily aware of the
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significance of the co-location ‘adjustment’ in the HASU
site location decision-making process, and it is certainly
the case that no such wider public awareness of the
‘controversy’, as highlighted above, permeated further
than individual members of the decision-making team.
Secondly, our interview data highlight that a ‘pan-London
ethos’, or London stroke specialist clinical identity
emerged amongst those involved in designing the new
city-wide services, which ultimately trumped traditional
institutional loyalty. Thirdly, some senior clinicians whose
local services were downgraded were appointed to se-
nior pan-London stroke leadership roles:
“So when he was appointed to the job, before we
confirmed the job, I saw him and said, ‘If you’re going
to do this job, you’ve got to not, you’ve got to forget
about keeping [a HASU service at your own hospital],’
and he’d come round to the view that the right thing
to do was take forward the eight [HASU model]…
Then it’s fantastic, because then if anyone wants to
say, ‘Well I don’t like this because I’m losing my
singlehanded neurologist from Nether Wallop DGH,’
wherever it is, he says, ‘You want to share your pain
with me, my friend? I’ve just had to preside over the
closure of [a very high performing] unit in London, so
what’s your problem?” (SHA Senior Manager)
The willingness of such senior clinicians to promote
the overall reforms in spite of the impacts these had on
their own institutions added to the overall credibility of
the model and was useful for minimising further clinical
dissent and thus ‘holding the line’ [15]. The implications
of these results are now discussed.
Discussion
In this article, we showed how the SHA executive
management team reflectively developed and operatio-
nalised a clinical, evidence-based discourse to frame
problems and identify solutions building on the work of
the Darzi Review into London’s health services. The dual
ethical and economic rationale behind the proposed
changes [65] was emphasised in documentation aimed at
the public and professionals, and a communications
strategy [56], which identified clinicians as key messen-
gers and called for them to be directed to highlight the
life-saving nature of the reforms, was established [4, 25].
In this respect, the goals of the senior SHA managers
and stroke specialist clinicians were aligned in the first
stage of the reconfiguration process – decision to change
[15, 66]. However, when it came to the second stage of
the reconfiguration process – decision on which model
to implement [15], given the lack of clinical evidence to
guide how many HASUs would be optimal, and the diffi-
culty of reconciling quality and access criteria to guide
exactly where they ought to be located, we presented
data to show that the SHA executive management team
utilised ‘top down’ [21] managerial strategies to limit the
centralised HASU model to eight sites and devised what
were perceived by some on the Stroke Project Board as
ex post ‘adjustments’ to justify decisions about HASU
site location. In this respect, the goals of the senior SHA
managers and some stroke specialist clinicians diverged,
as this led to an existing high performing stroke unit
effectively being downgraded. Notwithstanding this con-
troversy, the reconfiguration proceeded and the overall
‘line was held’.
The practical implications of this study are linked to
the fact that the London stroke reforms have in recent
years become a model of reference for ‘successful recon-
figuration’ [7, 17, 18]. Whilst the clinical results may be
impressive [19], it is important that we appreciate the
messy and contested trade-offs that shaped this high
profile service reconfiguration and explore the forms of
power mobilised by senior SHA executives at different
times and contexts in order to ‘hold the line’. The recon-
figuration process was characterised by strong leadership
from the SHA executive team [8, 15] and effective pres-
entational control over key strategic messages. The
discursive ‘line was held’ through an effective framing
and communications strategy led by the SHA, as was
the managerial ‘line’, through goal alignment and target
setting for key figures within the connected NHS organi-
sations accountable to the SHA in London. Interview
data collected from key actors involved in the reconfig-
uration suggest that some (but not all) informants
perceived that important elements of the decision-
making criteria around HASU location were adjusted ex
post and that this impacted upon the robustness and
transparency of the overall process. In practical terms,
this paper seeks to illuminate hitherto hidden perspec-
tives around how such complex and contested decisions
and the mobilisation of managerial power to maintain
strategic coherence may be experienced by individual
stakeholders.
In theoretical terms this work highlights the importance
of the discourse of EBM as a technique of power in that it
establishes new standards, or norms, through which prob-
lems are constructed and understood [28, 33]. This is
helpful in understanding the broad unanimity of purpose
amongst clinicians, managers, public and other stake-
holders with respect to the depoliticised framing of the
pan-London stroke reforms and gaining legitimacy for the
decision to change services in principle [15]. With respect
to the decision on which model to implement in practice
[15], however, the bounded and contested nature of the
actual evidence available and the difficulty of aligning the
competing values of service quality and patient access,
illustrates the limits of the discourse of EBM and the
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importance of other forms of power that enable managers
to pursue their strategic goals [21]. It is therefore import-
ant to consider the interaction of discursive power and
hierarchical forms of managerial power and their implica-
tions for implementation [35] and health systems research
and policy more broadly [21, 34, 36].
A limitation of our study is the lack of public and
patient participation. Whilst we focus on how research
evidence was utilised and power mobilised by senior
decision-makers in order to ‘hold the line’ in the early
stages of the reconfiguration, it would be useful to explore
public and patient understandings of these phenomena [7]
both in the United Kingdom and internationally.
Conclusion
We suggest that this article offers important empirical
and theoretical contributions. In empirical terms, we
identified the key processes and techniques through
which senior decision-makers set the agenda around the
decision to change, and the decision on which model
to implement in the London stroke care reforms of
2008–2012. We harnessed documentary and interview
data to add a new dimension to the overall understanding
of this high profile and highly regarded reconfiguration. In
theoretical terms, we critically explored the concept of
‘holding the line’ and problematised [32, 33] this in rela-
tion to how research evidence was mobilised and power
was exerted by senior SHA managers to secure desired
outcomes in this complex clinical service reconfiguration.
We identified two forms of power that the SHA executive
team drew upon in order to ‘hold the line’; firstly, discur-
sive power [20–23], which through an emphasis on
clinical evidence, better patient outcomes, professional
support and clinical credibility, alongside a tightly
managed consultation process, helped to shape a (public,
political and institutional) context that was broadly recep-
tive to the overall decision to change stroke services in the
capital in a radical way. Secondly, once the essential
parameters of the decision to change services had been
agreed, the SHA executive team ‘held the line’ through
hierarchical NPM style power [21, 63] to minimise trad-
itional ‘inflationary’ pressures to de-radicalise reconfigur-
ation plans [12] through ‘top down’ decision-making. We
conclude that it is important to explicitly consider the
interplay between research evidence, power and policy in
studies of health service reconfiguration in order to get a
deeper understanding of the roles played by different
actors in setting agendas and shaping new systems. In the
new post-SHA NHS landscape, the implications of these
findings may be of use to those tasked with delivering,
designing and evaluating the Sustainability and Trans-
formation Plans in England [67], as well as those exploring
service redesign elsewhere in the United Kingdom and
beyond [68].
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